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ARTICLE

TECHNOLOGY'S FUTURE IMPACT ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MONTANA
EXAMPLE
By Mark S. Kende*

We live at a time of great technological development in
areas like biotechnology and cyberspace. Indeed, science fiction
is becoming reality. In August 2002, a controversial American
based scientist, Dr. Panos Zavos, appeared on Connie Chung's
CNN television show, along with an infertile married couple,
and announced he was going to clone children for that couple at
a secret foreign location.1 MSNBC subsequently reported on a
Great Falls, Montana, woman who seeks to clone her deceased
daughter, the victim of a tragic car accident. 2 This all follows
3
the 1997 cloning of the sheep "Dolly" in Scotland.
* Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law.

B.A. Yale

University. J.D. University of Chicago Law School. This article is derived from a speech
given at the 30th Anniversary of the Montana Constitution Symposium, hosted by the
University of Montana School of Law in 2002. The author would like to thank the
following people for their assistance: Martin Burke, Sibylle Clark, Stacey Gordon, Tara
Harris, Larry Howell, Tom Huff, Brady Peterson, Gary Pulsinelli, Glenn Reynolds, and
Chase Rosario. Any errors or omissions are solely the author's responsibility.
1.
CNN.
Couple
plan
to
clone
a
baby,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH08/13/cloned.birth.cnna/index.html (Aug. 13, 2002).
2. Julia
Sommerfeld,
Coveting
a
Clone,
at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/768363.asp?pne=msn&cpl=l (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).

3.

LEE

M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: How GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING
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There have been advances in other assisted reproduction
technologies. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (or embryo
screening) is perhaps the most controversial form of high tech
reproduction. 4 It allows prospective parents who use In Vitro
Fertilization (IVF) to choose their child's sex. Their doctor
implants into the woman's womb an embryo that has a
particular gender's DNA.
The mapping of the human genome opens new doors. 5
Doctors can screen out embryos with a genetic predilection for
Alzheimer's disease. 6 Genetic engineering may permit scientists
to alter the genes of embryos and negate predilections for
certain illnesses. 7 In addition, scientists are trying to find the
genetic key for living longer.
These developments have influenced drug treatments. The
field of pharmaco-genetics is based on research showing a
person's genetic makeup may determine the effectiveness of
medications in treating their illness.8 Moreover, increased
knowledge about the brain enables doctors to prescribe
serotonin enhancing medications, like Prozac and Zoloft, to
alleviate depression. 9 This is neuro-technology. 10
Many of these developments are only possible because of
augmentations in computer power and function. Perhaps the
most significant technological development of our time, the
Internet, derives from the networking of computers throughout
2
the world.1 1 This is the computer and information age.'
WILL TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 118 (Avon Books 1998).

Interestingly, Dolly

was named after Dolly Parton, since the sheep was cloned from another sheep's
mammary gland cell.
4. Aaron Zimmer, Screening Lets Out Genetic Genie: Embryo Choice Based on
Gender,Disease CreatesEthicalFirestorm,DENVER POST Aug. 4, 2002, at 18A.
5. See generally Kathy Hudson, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and
the Law: the American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughsin Genetic Science, 51
AM. U. L.REV. 431 (2002).

6. Cass R. Sunstein, Keeping Up with the Cloneses, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE at
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020506&s=sunsteinO50602&c=l (May 1, 2002).
7. See generally SILVER, supra note 3, at 266; GREGORY STOCK, REDESIGNING
HUMANS, OUR INEVITABLE GENETIC FUTURE (Houghton Mifflin 2002).
8. Interview with Gary Pulsinelli, Law Professor, in Knoxville, Tennessee, July
11, 2002. Professor Pulsinelli is a law professor with a PhD. in molecular biology.
9. FRANCIS FuKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 46 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2002).
10. Open Your Mind, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002 at 77 ("Genetics may yet
threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous and gut the concept of
human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these things first.")
11. Heba Shams, Law in the Context of Globalisation:A Framework Analysis, 35
IN'L LAW. 1589, 1601 (2002) ("The Internet is the global technology par excellence.").
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Interestingly, code is at the heart of bio-technology (genetic code)
13
and computers (computer programming code).
This article focuses on biotechnology and the Internet
because of their significance. However, important developments
15
are also occurring in artificial intelligence, 14 nano-technology,
and cryonics. 16 The question is whether we are moving towards
Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World" or whether these
developments will make the world better. No simple answer is
available because technologies can be used for good or bad.
Cloning could help infertile couples. Or, it could create body
parts for harvesting. A person who knows their genetic makeup
may make informed choices about elective medical procedures.
But a health insurer could use that information to deny
coverage.
These possibilities are summarized by two scholars. In his
book, Our Posthuman Future, Johns Hopkins University
Professor Francis Fukuyama argued that we have "a fear that,
in the end, biotechnology will cause us in some way to lose our
humanity, that is, some essential quality that has always
underpinned our sense of who we are and where we are
going...,,17
In Remaking Eden, however, Princeton University Professor
Lee Silver states of biotechnology:
Why not seize this power? Why not control what has been left to
chance in the past? Indeed, we control all other aspects of our
children's lives and identities through powerful social and

12.
13.

Id.
Regarding computers and the Internet, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE

AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books 1999).

14. This is where computers or computerized objects like robots develop thinking
capabilities approaching humans. See John McCarthy, What is Artificial Intelligence?,at
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmclwhatisai/whatisai.html
(July 20, 2002); Curtis
Gillespie, Charmed by Six Feet of Circuitry,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,2002 at El.
15. This is the ability to program matter with molecular precision and have the
matter yield certain objects e.g. atom by atom manufacturing of objects from the bottom
up. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology: Some
PreliminaryObservations.31 ENV. L. REP. 10681 (2001); Scott R. Burrell, Interview: Sen.
Wyden
Eyes
Nanotech,
UPI
SCIENCE
NEWS,
at
http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20020920-030036-4843r (Sep. 22, 2002); Tiny
Memory
Chips
Made
From
Molecules,
at
http://www.esudbury.com/cip/index.cfm/news,53,en,0,0,0,9,122 (Sep. 9, 2002); Kenneth Chang, It
Slices!
It Dices!
Nanotube Struts Its Stuff, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/16/science/physical]16NANO.html? (July 16, 2002).
16. Michael Janofsky, Even for the Last .400 Hitter, Cryonics is the Longest Shot,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/10/science/lOWILL.html? (July 10, 2002).
17. FUKUYAMA,supra note 9, at 101.
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environmental influences and, in some cases, with the use of
powerful drugs like Ritalin and Prozac. On what basis can we
reject positive genetic influences on a person's essence when we
accept the right of parents to benefit their children in every other
way.18

This article does not, in the end, examine biotechnology and
cyberspace isses from ethical or medical perspectives. Instead it
discusses how these technologies will impact the Montana
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Montana Constitution.
Now, predicting the future is tricky business. But a cautious
prognosis is possible. This prognosis has three parts. Part One
discusses what makes the Montana Constitution unique, with a
focus on those provisions relevant to technology. It also shows
how federal laws may be enacted, which preempt the state on
many of these issues. For example, U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft's efforts to negate Oregon's assisted suicide law and
California's medical marijuana law demonstrate the possibility
of federal preemption. 19
Assuming federal law is not preemptive, Part Two discusses
some general legal effects these new technologies will have on
Montana constitutional law. One effect is that the Montana
Supreme Court will have to carefully weigh 20 multiple parties'
interests rather than just applying strict scrutiny (and striking
down the law) or rationality review (and upholding the law).
For example, disputes may arise over embryos produced by IVF
that create constitutional interests in a genetic father, a genetic
mother, a surrogate mother, and others. Strict scrutiny then
resolves nothing.
These technologies will also force the Montana Supreme
Court to decide how the Montana Constitution's privacy
provision apples to non-government actors. This will determine
what health insurers and employers can do with genetic data.
Part Three then examines two cases that could come up in
Montana. Specifically, the state legislature could ban cloning.
An insurance company could also use genetic data without

18. SILVER, supra note 3, at 277. One wonders if Professor Silver is familiar with
the concept of hubris from the Greek tragedies.
19. See, e.g., Joseph Cordaro, The Attorney General Targets Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act, 70 FoRDHAM L.REv. 2477 (May 2002).
20. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)("Last
year, in one of our Court's first forays into First Amendment law in the digital age, we
took an 'evolutionary' approach to the task of tailoring familiar constitutional rules to
novel technological circumstances, favoring narrow' holdings that would permit the law
to mature on a 'case-by-case' basis.").
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permission. My view is that Montana can prohibit reproductive
cloning but the question is not so clear with therapeutic cloning.
I also believe Montana's privacy provision protects genetic data
from misuse by non-government entities.
I.

THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION.
A. The Montana Constitution

The Montana
Constitution differs from the U.S.
Constitution in many ways.
The Montana Constitution
explicitly protects individual dignity and privacy. It also has
provisions which restrict non-government actors, whereas the
U.S. Constitution generally only restricts the government. 2 1 In
addition, Montana guarantees the public's right to know, with
some limitations. The Montana Constitution contains a right to
a clean and healthful environment, as well as provisions
regarding education and welfare.
The U.S. Constitution
contains no references to socio-economic matters.
Some of these rights provisions were based on concerns
about technology. During the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention debates. During the privacy debate, delegate Bob
Campbell said:
Today, with wiretaps, electronic and bugging devices, photo
surveillance equipment and computerized data banks, a person's
privacy can be invaded without his knowledge and the information
so gained can be misused in the most insidious ways. It isn't only
a careless government that has this power to pry; political
organizations, private information gathering firms, and even an
individual can now snoop more easily and more effectively than
ever before. We certainly hope that such snooping is not as
widespread as some persons would have us believe, but with
technology easily available and becoming more refined all the
time, prudent safeguards against the misuse of such technology
22
are needed.

Campbell's statement reveals that Montana adopted its
privacy provision to defend against improving technological
surveillance and data collection techniques, bolstered by
computerization. His statement also shows the privacy provision
applies to non-government snooping.
21. See e.g. James H. Goetz, Interpretations of the Montana Constitution:
Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes Erratic,51 MONT. L. REV. 289, 299 (1990).
22. Mont. Const. Conv., 1971-2, Vol. V, 1681 (1979) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the framers were right to be concerned with
technology. In State v. Siegal,23 the court held the warrantless
use of thermal imaging technology violates the right to privacy.
The court relied for support on delegate Campbell's statements.
In Armstrong v. State,24 the court discussed various medical
practices before ruling that women have a fundamental right to
obtain abortion before viability. But what about preemption?
B. Federalpreemption.
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution means the
U.S. Constitution and federal law trump state constitutions or
laws. This is preemption. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act's
provisions enhancing cyberspace surveillance mechanisms
cannot be challenged as violating the Montana Constitution's
privacy provision. Similarly bills have been proposed in
Congress to ban cloning,25 prohibit genetic testing and
discrimination, 26 and govern the Internet. If adopted, these laws
would leave little room for the Montana Constitution to have an
impact.
Of course, these bills may not pass. And any bills that
becomes law could be vulnerable. For example, federal laws
prohibiting the distribution of pornography to children over the
Internet, 2 7 and banning the development of DVD decryption
code, 28 have been challenged as violating freedom of speech. But
even if these federal laws are invalidated, the Montana
legislature may face problems filling these gaps because its laws

23. 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997).
24. 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364.
25. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, S. 1899, 107th Cong. (2002) (sponsored
by Sen. Sam Brownback R-KS); Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2002, S. 2439, 107th
Cong. (2002) (sponsored by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA). The Brownback bill has
significant support among the pro-life movement as it would ban all cloning. The
Specter bill would only ban reproductive cloning, but would allow therapeutic cloning.
Surprisingly, Sen. Orrin Hatch supports the Specter bill. Senators'Bill Details Rules on
Cloning Research, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 2002 at A3. Former Senate Majority
leader Tom Daschle refused to allow the cloning issue to reach the Senate floor. Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Total Ban on Cloning Research Appears Dead, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/14/politics/14CLON.html (June 13, 2002). The House
of Representative has already passed legislation banning all cloning.
26. See Symposium, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The
American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L.
REV. 451, 460-1 (2002).
27. See e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See generally Jason Krause, Can
Anyone Stop Internet Porn?,A.B.A.J., Sep. 2002, at 56.
28. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/10

6

2003

TECHNOLOGY'S FUTURE IMPACT
279
Kende: Technology's Future Impact on State Constitutional Law

might be subject to First Amendment and dormant Commerce
Clause attacks. 29 The Montana Constitution might not play a
role in these issues.
Proposed federal laws banning cloning raise the most
interesting preemption issue. Nuclear transfer cloning is a
process whereby human embryos could be produced without
needing the union of sperm and egg. 30 A special cell would be
taken from an adult and fused with a female egg that has had
its nucleus removed. After fusion, the egg would start dividing,
not unlike in a pregnancy, and an embryo could be created. The
embryo's DNA would essentially come from the cell, not the egg
whose nucleus was removed.
But is there a federal constitutional power to regulate
cloning? If not, the states would be free to regulate cloning.
Indeed, six states have enacted cloning laws. 31 The Montana
Supreme Court would also remain free to address cloning. To
assess federal power here, one must examine the Commerce
Clause.
Article One, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution says
Congress may regulate commerce among the several states.
Congress may not regulate matters purely internal to a state
because of federalism principles, namely the idea that states
have police powers with which the federal government cannot
interfere. For most of the 20th Century, the U.S. Supreme Court
did not question Congress on its broad uses of Commerce
power. 32 But in 1995, the Court refused to allow Congress to
33
regulate a non-economic activity purely internal to a state.
29. The court used the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down a New York law
banning the distribution of pornography over the Internet to minors in ALA v. Pataki,
969 F. Supp. 160, 183-184 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Two other courts agree. See ACLU v.
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10 th Cir. 1999); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55
F. Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999). But see State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash.
2001)(state anti-spam legislation does not violate dormant Commerce Clause); Jack
Goldsmith & Alan Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE
L.J. 785 (2001). Several bills have been introduced in the Montana legislature to ban
porn over the Internet directed at minors and accessible via libraries. House Bill No.
262 (2001 Mont. Legis.); Senate Bill No. 139 (2001 Mont. Legis.); House Bill No. 376
(1999 Mont. Legis.).
30. See generally SILVER, supra note 3; Kyla Dunn, Cloning Trevor, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, June 2002 at 31.
31. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, States Pursue Cloning Laws as Congress Debates, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
26,
2002,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/search/articlepage.html?res=9803E6DA153BF935A15756COA9649C8B63 (May 26, 2002). The states
are California, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Virginia.
32. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Where does cloning fit?
Jack Balkin at Yale and Glenn Reynolds at Tennessee argue
that a law banning cloning might be viewed by the U.S.
Supreme Court as regulating the creation of children which is a
family matter, not economic activity. 34 Our national government
cannot legislate childbirth policies as China does. Moreover,
there's currently no economic market for human cloning. The
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Morrison35 and
United States v. Lopez 36 show the Court's restrictive approach to
Commerce Clause power. In addition, state licensing boards
typically govern the medical profession. Thus, the federal
government would be interfering unconstitutionally in a
traditional state activity. This would mean Montana could still
regulate cloning.
Anne Lawton at Miami, Lori Andrews at Kent, and Curtis
Bradley at Notre Dame, however, argue cloning is part of the
national economic market for high tech reproductive services
similar to IVF clinics.3 7 Certainly, one suspects Dr. Zavos is not
donating his services to couples. Moreover, people who want to
engage in cloning will often have to travel across state lines as
only certain facilities and doctors will have the expertise. The
knowledge and equipment these doctors rely upon will
frequently have interstate origins. Thus, cloning is economic
unlike the activities regulated in Morrison and Lopez. And the
proposed federal laws on cloning contain findings of an effect on

34. Glenn
Harlan
Reynolds,
Fair-Weather
Federalism,
at
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/0,3566,50840,00.html (April 22, 2002);
Jack
Balkin,
The
Cloning
Conundrum,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/30/opinion/30BALK.html
(Jan. 30, 2002).
Balkin
thinks the U.S. Supreme Court has been incorrect in its recent Commerce Clause
decisions limiting federal power, but it's not clear Reynolds shares Balkin's view on that
point.
35. 529 U.S. at 617 (2000) (Court struck down Violence Against Women Act
despite voluminous Congressional findings regarding effect on interstate commerce
because the Court ruled no economic activity was implicated).
36. 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (Court invalidated federal law that prohibits the
carrying of a weapon near a public school because no economic activity was regulated).
37. Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The Constitutionality of a
Federal Ban on Human Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 277 (1999); Lori B. Andrews, Is There a
Right To Clone? ConstitutionalChallenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 643 (1998); Testimony of Curtis Bradley before the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Crime, the Committee on the Judiciary regarding the Human Cloning
Prohibition
Act
of
2001,
June
19,
2001,
at
17,
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/udiciary/hju72982.000hju72982_1.HTM
(June
19, 2001). Andrews authored the White Paper legal analysis for the Clinton Bioethics
commission.
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interstate commerce.
I believe this latter group of scholars is right in arguing the
Commerce Clause could support a federal anti-cloning law for
the reasons just mentioned. If such a federal law were enacted,
and if it survived constitutional challenges, there would be no
room for state laws in that area. But that's an awful lot of "ifs."
So for now, it is safe to assume the Montana Constitution will be
relevant on the technology questions mentioned.
II. TECHNOLOGY'S FUTURE IMPACT ON THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION.
New technologies will effect Montana constitutional law in at
least two ways. First, the Montana Supreme Court will have to
employ balancing tests in certain cases. Second, the Court will
address how Montana's privacy provisions apply to nongovernment actors.
A. Balancing Tests.
New technologies often pressure established legal categories
by posing unforeseen situations. 38 Sometimes courts stay with
the old categories, which can be awkward. Courts can also
adopt new categories, 39 or they can develop more flexible tests.40
38. David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 71 (2002).
39. For example, some scholars have argued that cyberspace deserves a legal
regime of its own. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders B The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). But see Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996).
40. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (flexible "undue burden"
test adopted). One well known scholar has said of balancing that:
Judges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were willing to balance the
need for private papers against the seriousness of the crime, and were far more
willing to compel the production of diaries and letters in cases involving mass
murders than in civil and white-collar investigations. If eighteenth-century
values are to be translated into the age of cyberspace, Congress today could
require judges or special privacy masters to engage in the same constitutional
balancing test, issuing court orders to decrypt secret documents only in cases
where individual suspicion is high and the crime being investigated is very
serious indeed.
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 181 (Random House 2000). See also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 491 (2nd ed. 2002)

(Regarding the state action doctrine, "some scholars have advocated that the Court
should engage in an explicit balancing test rather than choose entirely based on the
identity of the actors.") This section uses the word "balancing" interchangeably with the
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Biotechnology and the Internet often raise issues that
implicate multiple parties, and this will likely force the Montana
Supreme Court to balance the interests of these parties, rather
than utilize blunt strict scrutiny or easy rationality.
1. Montana Scenarios on Balancing.
One area where Montana courts will have to use balancing
is in Montana divorce proceedings if there's a custody dispute
about embryos in out of state IVF clinic freezers. In 2001, a
Montana legislator recognized the problem and introduced a
41
comprehensive bill, but it did not advance.
The seminal case is the 1992 Tennessee Supreme Court
decision in Davis v. Davis.42 The court ruled a genetic father's
interest in not being a parent outweighed his ex-wife's interest
in donating the embryos to other infertile couples despite her
being the genetic mother. The court said that there is a
fundamental right to procreate, but also a fundamental right not
to procreate. Besides weighing the interests of the genetic
father, the genetic mother, the embryo, the infertile couple, and
society, the court explained that modem technology creates at
least four different types of parenting interests: genetic,
gestational, bearing, and rearing.4 3 The court also said, unlike
abortion cases, the woman's body integrity interest was not
present in regard to embryos in a freezer.
Cyberspace poses complex issues as well. 44
Suppose
Montana passed a law banning out of state Web site owners
from placing a cookie, without permission, on a Montana
resident's computer and tracking the resident's Internet

word "weighing."
41. An Act Providing for Assisted Reproduction and Gestational Agreements, H.R.
553, 57th Leg. Sess. (2001). Introduced by H. Raser, 2001 Montana Legislature,
available at http://data.opi.state.mt.usbills/2001/billhtmlIHBO553.htm (Feb. 12, 2001).
42. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
43. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. See also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). See
generally Andreas S. Voss, The Right to Privacy & Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A
ComparativeStudy of the Law of Germany and the U.S., 21 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 229 (2002).
44. A Cincinnati court administrator thought he would facilitate the public's access
to court records by putting them on the Internet. Yet certain people in the community
protested, claiming the Web site provided overly easy access to highly embarrassing
personal information from divorce court and traffic violations files. These people in
effect asked the administrator to value privacy interests more and the public's right to
know less. Jennifer Lee, Dirty Laundry, Online for All to See, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 2002,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/05/technology/circuits/O5CINC.html.
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habits.45 Although this law has a good purpose, it might violate
the dormant Commerce Clause, which says states can't pass
laws that unduly interfere with the nation's business.
How is undue interference determined? The U.S. Supreme
Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc 46 announced courts must

weigh the importance of the state's interest against the law's
burden on interstate commerce. Thus, Montana's constitutional
privacy interest in blocking cookies would be weighed against
the burden on those Web sites that use cookies to facilitate
business 4 In State v. Heckel, 48 the Washington Supreme Court
ruled a Washington law restricting e-mail spain did not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause. 49 Cookies are more invasive
than spam so Montana's privacy interest seems stronger in this
hypothetical.
Lastly, cyberspace free speech cases do not resemble the
classic scenario of the government suppressing an individual's
speech. A law regulating porn on the World Wide Web can effect
the free speech interests of on-line companies, Web site owners,
content creators and publishers, adults who want to see the
material, children who should not see it, and others.50 These
free speech questions are particularly difficult for public

45. See, e.g., Bryan T. McKinney, Dwayne Whitten, Arkansas Surfers and Their
Privacy or Lack Thereof Does the Common Law Invasion of Privacy Tort Prohibit ETailers' Use of"Cookies"?. 24 U.ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 751 (2002).
46. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
47. An interesting question is whether a state's interest in its citizen's privacy can
receive more weight in the dormant Commerce Clause assessment, as against the
interstate commerce burden, if the state has a history of court decisions that provide an
especially strong endorsement of privacy rights as in Montana.
48. 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
49. Three courts have ruled that state efforts to ban the distribution of Internet
porn to minors in the state violate the dormant Commerce Clause. ACLU v. Johnson,
194 F.3d 1149, 1160-1161 (10 t- Cir. 1999); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler,
55 F.Supp.2d 737, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999); ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183-184
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The reasoning used by the courts suggests they would find that a state
law banning spam outright would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
50. Mark S. Kende, Lost in Cyberspace: The Judiciary's DistractedApplication of
Free Speech and Personal JurisdictionPrinciples in Cyberspace, 77 ORE. L. REV. 1125,
1175 n. 266 (1997), citing, Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from
First Amendment Dcotrine: Justice Beyer's New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 817 (1998) ("The new balancing casts a wider net and recognizes that, in the
contemporary electronic media context, many speech interests seek access."); Jeffrey
Rosen, Modest Proposal,Stephen Breyer Restrains Himself, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE,
Jan. 3, 2002, at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020114&s=rosenOll4O2 ("Breyer
used a balancing approach to evaluate the competing First Amendment interests
affected by a law regulating indecency on cable TV stations and another law requiring
local cable TV operators to carry broadcast signals.")
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libraries. 51
2. Montana Precedents on Balancing.
Luckily, balancing tests are not foreign to Montana
constitutional law. In Kapstein v. Conrad Sch. Dist.,52 the
Montana Supreme Court ruled that a private school student did
not have a constitutional right to participate in the neighboring
public school's extracurricular activities. But the court did not
employ rationality review because the student had a legitimate
educational interest at stake, though not a fundamental one.
The court said "the [student's] asserted right to participate must
53
be balanced against the School District's interests."
The right to know cases require judicial balancing. Thus in
Great Falls Tribune Co., Inc. v. Sheriff,54 the Montana Supreme
Court ruled a police officer's right to privacy regarding his
disciplinary record was outweighed by the public's right to

know.
These kinds of cases should guide the Montana Supreme
Court. New technologies make rigid categorical approaches
awkward.5 5
Thus, courts should engage in fact specific
balancing analyses which leave room for different results later if
the technology changes. 56
The court can also draw on

51. The United States Supreme Court has agreed to decide the constitutionality of
a federal law that requires public libraries to install filtering software on Internet
accessible computers as a condition to the library receiving federal funds. See ALA v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
52. 281 Mont. 152, 160, 931 P.2d 1311, 1316 (1997).
53. Kapstein, 281 Mont. at 160, 931 P.2d at 1316 (emphasis added). Justice Rice
said the Montana Supreme Court should be careful in certain environmental rights cases
to balance those rights against the right to acquire, possess, and protect property. Cape
France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed, 2001 MT 139, T 61, 305 Mont. 513, T 61, 29 P.3d
1011, 1 61. In Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont, 426, 712 P.2d 309 (1986), the
court said there was no fundamental right to welfare. The court, however, also said that
a law restricting such important benefits deserves more than rationality. The court then
weighed the individual's interest against the state's particular justification and ruled
against the state. The court said, "Where constitutionally significant interests are
implicated by governmental classification, arbitrary lines should be condemned.
Further, there should be balancing of the rights infringed and the governmental interest
to be served by such infringement." (emphasis added) Butte though is not well regarded
because the court ignored the welfare provision's mandatory language. Later, a
constitutional amendment resolved the textual problem and effectively upheld the
court's ruling.
54. 238 Mont. 103, 106, 775 P.2d 1267, 1269 (1989).
55. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
56. Id.; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Kende,
supra note 50.
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comparative constitutional law. Countries like Canada and
South Africa use "proportionality analysis" when examining
rights questions. 57 Their courts balance individual interest
against state's interest. The Montana Supreme Court, however,
should not abandon strict scrutiny. The doctrine still makes
sense when the government is impairing fundamental rights, or
when government is barring speech based on hostility to the
viewpoint. But it may not make sense in these more complex
situations.
B. Non-government Actors.
The Montana Supreme Court in cases like Cape France
Enterprises v. Estate of Peed5 8 and Montana Environmental
Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality59
has indicated the Constitution can apply to non-government
actors in environmental matters. 60
Can the Montana
Constitution also apply to such actors in cases involving new
technologies? Take e-mail monitoring for example. One study
estimates that 3/4 of major U.S. firms spot-check the e-mails,
computers files, Internet activities, and phone calls of
employees. 6 1 In a recent Montana law review article, I argued
that electronic eavesdropping by a non-government employer
may well violate Montana's privacy protections. 62 What is the
basis for the view that non-government employees have a right
not to be monitored?
First, as already mentioned, the Montana Constitution's
framers intended the privacy right to restrict non-government
actors from electronic eavesdropping (e.g. e-mail monitoring)
and most other forms of computerized data acquisition. Several

57. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Breyer has recently supported the use of such a
proportionality analysis in certain cases. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution,
77 NYU L. REV. 245, 253 (2002).
58. Cape-France, 32.
59. 296 Mont. 207, 225, 988 P.2d 1236 (1999).
60. A Montana Assistant Attorney General conceded this point during the oral
argument in a case with environmental implications. Cameron Carter & Kyle Karinen,
Note, A Question of Intent: The Montana Constitution, Environmental Rights, and the
MEIC Decision, 22 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 97, 130 n.201 (2001).
61. Mark S. Kende, The Issues of E-Mail Privacy and Cyberspace Personal
Jurisdiction:What Clients Need to Know About Two Practical ConstitutionalQuestions
Regarding the Internet, 63 MONT. L. REV. 301, 303 (2002). The Montana Supreme Court
recently ruled that private causes of action may be available for state constitutional
rights. See Dorwalt v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, 312 Mont. 1, 58, 58 P.3d 128.
62. Kende, supra note 61.
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scholars such as Professor Larry Elison have confirmed this in
63
their writings.
Second, the privacy provision's language is not limited to
government. It says, "The right of individual privacy is essential
to the well being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest." The
provision's passive tense ("shall not be infringed") does not
restrict who may do the infringing. Thus non-government actors
qualify.
Third, a contrary ruling would be bad public policy because
electronic eavesdropping is a serious workplace problem. It
would be a mistake for the court to dismiss the privacy
provision's relevance just because a non-government actor is
involved. Interestingly, the California Supreme Court has
interpreted the California Constitution privacy provision as
64
encompassing non-government actors.
Lastly, the Montana Constitution's dignity provision, which
explicitly protects against non-government violators, shows that
Montana citizens should be protected against such privacy
65
intrusions.
One major problem with this argument is the Montana
Supreme Court's 1985 decision in State v. Long66 which seemed
to say the privacy provision only restricts government actors.
Long refused to suppress evidence of marijuana possession even
though the marijuana was discovered by a private landlord who
illegally entered the renter's apartment. Long, however, should
be read narrowly to cover only the criminal search and seizure
context, and not 219t Century e-mail situations. A broader
interpretation of Long would be inconsistent with the intent
behind the privacy provision and with its text, as shown
previously.
63. William Rava, Comment, Toward a Historical Understanding of Montana's
Privacy Provision, 61 ALBANY L. REV. 1681, 1712 n. 213 (1998); Larry Elison & Dennis
NettikSimmons, Right of Privacy, 48 MONT. L. REV. 1,33-40 (1987); Edward MacDonald
Dobson, Search by PrivatePersons:State v. Long, 47 MONT. L. REV. 189, 206 (1986).
64. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 642 (Cal. 1994). In Hill, the Court, however,
refused to employ the compelling interest test. This is not an option in Montana because
the "compelling interest" language is actually incorporated in its constitutional privacy
provision.
65. James Goetz, Interpretationsof the Montana Constitution:Sometimes Socratic,
Sometimes Erratic,51 MONT. L. REV. 289, 299 (1990).
66. 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985). The Montana Supreme Court essentially
avoided the constitutional issues raised by computer "monitoring" in Harris v. Smartt,
2002 MT 239, 311 Mont. 507, 57 P.3d (The Court upheld discipling a Montana Justice of
the Peace for downloading child pornography onto a work computer.)
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In Long, however, the court said the privacy provision's
reference to a "compelling state interest" shows it only restricts
state actors. Yet, that language merely requires those entities,
who intrude on privacy interests, to employ compelling
considerations the state would usually endorse e.g. a private
company could justify monitoring e-mail based on evidence an
employee is committing a crime at work.67
Moreover, subsequent Montana Supreme Court decisions
suggest Long's restrictive privacy view (announced over strong
dissent) should be limited to search and seizure. Cases like
Armstrong v. State,68 upholding a woman's right to an abortion,
and Gryczan v. State,69 striking down sodomy laws, demonstrate
the court seeks to provide heightened privacy protection.
Gryczan says adults expect their consensual sexual activities
will "not be subject to the prying eyes of others or to
governmental snooping" and that "consenting adults expect that
neither the state nor their neighbors will be co-habitants of their
These excerpts show a concern with nonbedrooms." 70
government privacy violations.
III. TWO CASES
To sum up so far, if federal law is not preemptive, new
technologies will cause the Montana Supreme Court to use more
balancing tests and to apply the state constitution more
In this last section,
frequently to non-government actors.
cloning and genetic privacy are discussed.
A. Cloning.
Suppose a controversial scientist moves his laboratory to a
remote location in Montana where he hopes to engage in all
types of nuclear transfer cloning experimentation. The Montana
legislature finds out and passes two laws. First it prohibits
67. Prior to Long, the Montana Supreme Court ruled on several occasions that
Montana's privacy provision restricted non-government actors. In State v. Hyem, 193
Mont. 151, 630 P.2d 202 (1981) the court concluded that no compelling state interest
justified the privacy intrusion because the state did not carry out the intrusion. Hyem's
approach, however, rendered the compelling state interest test somewhat useless
because the test could never be satisfied when a non government actor was involved. By
contrast, this paper provides a coherent interpretation of the compelling state interest
test that gives it substance.
68. 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361,989 P.2d 364.
69. 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
70. Id. at 450, 942 P.2d at 122 (emphasis added).
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anyone from conducting or attempting to conduct human
reproductive cloning. Second, it bans anyone from conducting or
attempting to conduct therapeutic cloning. Would these bans be
consistent with the Montana Constitution?
1. Reproductive Cloning.
Suppose the Montana scientist wants to help the Great
Falls woman who lost her daughter. How would he do it? He
would try to clone a cell from the Great Falls woman's daughter,
implant the embryo in the woman's womb, and allow it to
mature into a fetus and then a baby. The baby would have
71
virtually the same genetic makeup as the deceased daughter.
As an aside, reproductive cloning can involve stranger scenarios.
A woman could clone one of her own cells and give birth to a
child who is her younger twin genetically.
The Montana Supreme Court will probably not rule that
reproductive cloning is a fundamental right.
There's no
tradition, current consensus, or broad societal movement in
favor of a right to asexual reproduction.
Strict scrutiny
therefore would likely not be applied.
Even if the court found a fundamental right, the
government could likely show the ban is narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling interest.
Despite Dr. Zavos'
pronouncements, scientists don't know how to do reproductive
cloning. Thus, President Bush's Council on Bioethics recently
said that, "Given the high rates of morbidity and mortality in
the cloning of other mammals, we believe that cloning to
produce children would be extremely unsafe. '72 The non71. Elizabeth Price Foley, The ConstitutionalImplications of a Cloning Society, 32
CuMB. L.REv. 503 (2002).
72. Pres. Bush Council on Bioethics, Exec. Summary, xvii (Prepublication version);
Art Caplan, Cloning Ethics: Separating the Science from the Fiction, MSNBC Health,
http://www.msnbc.com/news/768366.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2003) ("Nearly all experts
on primate cloning believe that monkey and human beings will never be cloned because
the biology of primate reproduction is simply unlike that of cats, goats, sheep and
mice."); Robert A. Weinberg, Of Clones and Clowns, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2002
at 54-55 ("Working with cows, [Advanced Cell Technology's cloning efforts] produced 496
embryos.. .Implanting the embryos... led to 110 established pregnancies, thirty of which
went to term. Five of the newborns died after birth, and a sixth died several months
later." He said there ended up being 24 surviving cows though they almost all had
enlarged placentas and "respiratory distress typical of Large Offspring Syndrome" that
often seems to result from animal cloning.) To date, ACT has only managed to have a
cloned human embryo reach six cells before it stopped dividing. Dunn, supra note 30, at
31. For a comparative perspective, see Danrich W. Jordon, Human Reproductive
Cloning: A Policy Framework for South Africa, 119 S.AFR. L.J. 294 (2002).
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partisan National Academy of Sciences agrees. It took 277
failed attempts to clone "Dolly" the sheep and she has developed
a peculiar premature arthritis.7 3 A ban on reproductive cloning
ensures a parade of horribles does not take place. And there are
numerous other possible state interests, such as preventing
identity confusion when the clone becomes aware she is
someone's twin.
One could criticize this reasoning by saying that
reproductive cloning technology cannot work unless experiments
are allowed. Moreover, any ban can be circumvented by people
going to other countries. In addition, the person who's being
prohibited from cloning may feel their individual dignity has
74
been impugned by the state telling them what they cannot do.
scientific
allowed
not
have
generally
we
Yet
experimentation on humans where the subjects could be injured.
And cloning involves experimenting with fetuses, including
those past viability, as well as with the lives of newborns. The
fact that people can travel abroad to avoid our laws does not
mean we must change them. The indignity some people might
feel at being prohibited from reproductive cloning is outweighed
by the indignity of creating fetuses with high rates of morbidity
and mortality.
2. Therapeutic Cloning.
Therapeutic cloning involves creating embryos for stem
cells. The likely motivation for Montana banning therapeutic
cloning would be the perceived denigration of life. However, the
constitutional analysis would not be the same as in the previous
73. Weinberg, supra note 72, at 54-55. Admittedly only a few of these 277 attempts
succeeded in producing embryos so this statistic should not be read as suggesting that
276 sheep embryos had to be discarded. 29 embryos were created with only one being
implanted. SILVER, supra note, 3 at 120. This high failure rate in embryo cloning
attempts is hardly a vote of confidence in the procedure.
74. Some courts have suggested that constitutional rights are implicated by IVF
procedures even outside the divorce context. See, e.g. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp.th
1361 (N.D. Ill.) affd without opinion, sub nom., Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7
Cir. 1990). One response to the textual argument is that cloning is no more likely to
result in discarded embryos than IVF. But this ignores the great morbidity and number
of abnormalities that would likely be connected to cloning, whereas IVF embryos
resemble at a high percentage normal human embryos. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is
There a ConstitutionalRight to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 998 (2002) ("It is highly
likely that cloned human beings would face serious medical problems leading, in many
cases to serious illnesses and early death. The underlying risks include high rates of
miscarriage, deformed children, premature aging, and high rates of cancer and other
disease. There are possible risks to the mother as well.").
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section.
In therapeutic cloning, the cloned embryo would be allowed
to grow up to fourteen days. During that growth, stem cells
would be extracted from the embryo. Many scientists believe
these cells can address serious health problems.7 5 Then the
embryo would be discarded. None of its cells would have begun
to resemble organs, it would not have any functioning nervous
system or brain, and it could be measured in millimeters.
Many scientists say embryonic stem cells will generate new
tissues and organs for transplants or surgery, and that use of
such cells will eliminate the rejection problem because the
embryo could have the same DNA as the sick person. Stem cells
could help cure severe spinal injuries, such as that suffered by
the actor Christopher Reeve, and illnesses like Parkinson's
disease.
There are some promising experimental results
76
already, mostly in animals.
Now with that additional background: Is this therapeutic
cloning ban constitutional?
In Armstrong v. State,77 the
Montana Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a law banning
physician assistants from performing abortions. The court used
strict scrutiny and concluded the law deprived women of a
convenient and safe health care option. The court also said
Montana's privacy right encompasses medical decision-making
generally. In addition, the court expressed frustration with the
Montana legislature's interference with medical licensing
procedures.
Armstrong's emphasis on an individual's autonomy to make
medical decisions, and its respect for the medical community,
supports the argument that a therapeutic cloning ban would be
unconstitutional as applied to a situation where such cloning
provides a key treatment option for a very sick person. As the
court stated, ".. .it is the individual making the decision, and no
one else, who, if he or she survives, must live with the results of
that decision. One's health is a uniquely personal possession.
The decision of how to treat that possession is of a no less
75. Dunn, supra note 30. See generally Heather Johnson Kukla, Note, Embryonic
Stem Cell Research:An Ethical Justification,90 GEO. L.J. 503 (2002).
76. Peter Aldhous, Can They Rebuild Us, NATURE, April 5, 2001 at 622. For
example, some scientists have reportedly reversed Parkinson's in rats. But others
believe that stem cells taken from adults work just as effectively. A recent Stanford
University study, however, seemed to show the adult stem cells don't work as well,
though the study has been questioned.
Adult Stem Cells a Bust, at
http://www.grg.orgtlWeissman.htm (Sep. 9, 2002).
77. 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364.
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personal nature."7 8 This is not a fantasy. The Atlantic Monthly
published a story in June 2002 titled "Cloning Trevor" which
was about a young boy who may die from a rare genetic disease
ALD, that ravages the brain, unless he receives a successful
bone marrow transplant. His family tried cloning. People like
Trevor should have the right to clone one of their cells to
generate the necessary tissue. The state has no interest to
justify costing Trevor his life.
Outside of that life threatening scenario, banning
therapeutic cloning prohibits promising scientific research and
experimentation.
This would not seem to infringe on a
fundamental right.
Perhaps the Montana Supreme Court
should therefore use rationality review and uphold the ban. But
there are reasons to think rationality would be too deferential.
Article II, Section 3, of the Montana Constitution says
persons have the right to seek health and happiness. This is
reenforced by Section Four's reference to individual dignity.
Therapeutic cloning therefore seems deserving of constitutional
protection, because it may facilitate better medical care for
individuals like Trevor. Moreover, some scholars have argued
the First Amendment protects scientific research.7 9 The U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Miller v. California, which involved
obscenity, says writings cannot be banned if they have serious
scientific value.
Because of the extraordinary health benefits that could
result from embryonic stem cell research and experimentation,
the Montana Supreme Court should avoid rationality. Instead,
the court should balance these benefits against the state's
interests. The result would depend on the evidence at trial

78.

Id.

54. See also Scott A. Fink, The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted

Suicide and Montana's ConstitutionalRight to PersonalAutonomy Privacy, 59 MONT. L.

REV. 301 (1998).
79. Elizabeth Price Foley, The ConstitutionalImplications of a Cloning Society, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 503 (2002); Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of
Human Cloning,42 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 678 (2000); Richard Delgado and David R. Millen,
God, Galileo, and Government: Towards Constitutional Protectionfor Scientific Inquiry,
53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978). See also Henley v. Wise, 302 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ind.
1969)("The first protected area is the right of scholars to do research and advance the
state of knowledge. This is the freedom of inquiry referred to in Griswold."). But see
Daniel Mark Cohen, Cloning and the Constitution, 26 NOVA L. REV. 532-41 (2002); Lori
Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 643, 661 (1998); Margaret S.
v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La.), affd, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986). Wynn v. Scott,
th
449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd 599 F.2d 193 (7
Cir. 1979). On a related issue,
several courts have ruled that computer code is speech despite its functional scientific
capabilities. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001)
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regarding the promise of embryonic stem cells, how many
embryos would have to be discarded, can we use existing stem
80
cell lines, can adult stem cells perform as effectively, etc.
The court could look for assistance to the National Academy
of Sciences which has endorsed therapeutic cloning, as has prolife U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch. But the court should also
consider the contrary statements of President Bush and his
national Bioethics Council.8 1 And the court should respect the
Montana legislature's judgement if it reveals careful
deliberation.
In conclusion, the ban on reproductive cloning would be
upheld under the Montana Constitution.
The ban on
therapeutic cloning would not be valid as applied to a specific
sick person with few alternatives. But the therapeutic cloning
ban might otherwise be constitutional, though that would
depend on how the court balances the competing interests.
B. Genetic Privacy.
Suppose a Montana life insurance company obtains genetic
data about one of its customers from an Internet data bank and
then boosts the customer's premium.
Would that violate
Montana's privacy provision?
As background, it is important to note that a confusing
scheme of federal8 2 and state laws 8 3 exist that partially regulates

80. Some commentators assert that the moral value and dignity of an existing life
exceeds the moral value and dignity of an embryo less than fourteen days old in which no
cells have differentiated and no organs yet exist. Michael S. Gazzaniga, Zygotes and
People Aren't Quite the Same, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2002 at A35. Gazzaniga is on the
Bush Commission. Many women miscarry embryos at this stage and don't even realize
they are pregnant. Mark S. Kende, Michigan's Proposed Prenatal Protection Act:
Undermininga Woman's Right to an Abortion, 5 AM. U. J. OF GENDER & SOCIAL POLICY
LAW 247, 248 (1996). No funeral is held if a miscarriage occurs, unlike the death of a
living human being.
81.
Jerome Groopman has authored a well reasoned article critiquing the Bush
Commission's proposed moratorium on therapeutic cloning. Jerome Groppman, Holding
Cell: Why the CloningDecision was Wrong, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5 &12, 2002 at 14.
82.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (1994).
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
imposes limits on genetic testing. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1935 (1996)(codified as
amended in sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) Both acts have major gaps. The ADA bars
genetic tests in hiring, but not at the post-offer stage. Jennifer R. Taylor, Mixing the
Gene Pool and the Labor Pool: Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination in
Employment, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 51, 55-6 (2001). Moreover, The EEOC
claims that the ADA bars discrimination in employment based on genetic predilections
because the law prohibits discrimination when someone is "regarded as" having an
impairment. Symposium, Panel Three: Privacy, Genetic Profilingand Discrimination,51
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84
genetic testing and discrimination. But the scheme has gaps.
Thus state constitutional protection could be very important.
Would the insurance company be violating the Montana
Constitution by setting premiums based on the genetic data? In
Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said, "[o]ne can think of
few subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate
privacy interests than that of one's health or genetic make-up."8 5

AM. U. L. REV. 451, 467-8 (presentation by EEOC Commissioner Miller). But the courts
and commentators do not necessarily agree. Brian M. Holt, Comment, Genetically
Defective: The Judicial Interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Fails to
ProtectAgainst Genetic Discriminationin the Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457
(2002).
The HIPAA mainly prohibits group health insurers from "using genetic
information to determine eligibility for enrollment or continuation of insurance
coverage.. .it fails to address ERISA-exempted self-insured employers and health
maintenance organizations... does not address genetic privacy concerns resulting from
the dissemination of genetic information, does not regulate genetic testing by
insurers.. .and does not prohibit employers from genetically discriminating against
people seeking health insurance." Sherwin Chen, Negotiating a Policy of Prudent Science
and Proactive Law in the Brave New World of Genetic Information, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
243, 260-1 (2001).
83. 39 states apparently have laws on genetic discrimination in health insurance
and 27 states have laws on genetic discrimination in the workplace. Glendora Hughes,
Genetically Incorrect, 35-FEB MD. B.J. 34, 39 (2002). Yet the state legislation is not
comprehensive nor often logically consistent. Jerry Elmer, Human Genomics: Toward a
New Paradigmfor Equal-ProtectionJurisprudence,50-APR R.I. B.J. 5, 28-9 (2002).
84. Montana, for example, prohibits, the use of genetic testing and information by
"insurers, health service corporations, HMO's, fraternal benefit societies, and other
issuers of individual, group policies, or certificates of insurance. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18901 to 904 (2001). But those statutes except "life, disability income, and long-term care
insurance." One insurance law expert says of Montana that:
it makes no sense whatever to prohibit insurance companies
from using genetic data when writing health insurance policies
while simultaneously allowing those same companies to use
the same genetic information when writing other types of
insurance policies for the same person. Either genetic
information is so private that it is off limits to insurance
companies, or it is not that private. Either there is a risk
that the companies will misuse the information or there is
not.
Jerry Elmer, Human Genomics: Toward a New Paradigm for Equal-Protection
Jurisprudence, 50-APR R.I. B.J. 5, 30 (2002). The Montana scheme gets even more
confusing if one takes into account. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (2001) which says
that, (3) "An insurer may not refuse to consider an application for life or disability
insurance on the basis of a genetic condition... (4) The rejection of an application or the
determining of rates, terms, or conditions of a life or disability insurance contract on the
basis of genetic condition... constitutes unfair discrimination unless the applicant's
medical condition and history and either claims experience or actuarial projections,
establish that substantial differences in claims are likely to result from the genetic
condition..."
85. 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Moreover, the Montana Constitution delegates feared
misuse of computerized data banks even by private entities.
Genetic information about people is often kept on computers or
other data banks. Thus, the framers would have found the use
of such data to violate privacy rights and to deserve strict
scrutiny.
Assuming the financial security of insurance companies is a
compelling state interest, the use of genetic data is not narrowly
tailored. Genetic data usually indicates a person has a greater
chance of developing a condition than others. But except for a
few illnesses, like Huntington's disease, often the condition does
not develop. Thus, use of such imprecise personal data would
violate the privacy provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The effect of new technologies on the Montana Constitution
Assuming there is no complete federal
will be complex.
preemption, the Montana Supreme Court will face issues that
require the use of balancing tests, and application of the state
constitution to private actors.
In the midst of all this legal analysis, it is important not to
lose sight of a more basic point. These technologies offer us
exciting opportunities, but they also pose risks to our humanity.
Cyberspace shows the societal significance of computer code as
reflected in the World Wide Web. The human genome project
has revealed the DNA code at our roots.
These codes break down legal categories and other barriers.
Better computer code leads to more sophisticated computers
that possess an artificial intelligence which at times seem
human. Cloning'in turn allows humans to play God. Hopefully
courts in Montana and elsewhere will show an awareness that
the dignity of humanity must be maintained even as we advance
in developing more sophisticated codes.
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